







The Existence of Evil in 
Christian and Naturalistic Worldviews
Abstract
I clarify that an evil state of affairs is a state of affairs that satisfies the following conditions: 
(a) It entails the physical or mental suffering of a subject of experience, (b) it is morally in­
excusable, (c) it does not lead to a greater good for the subject involved, and (d) the subject
would prefer not to be in this state if it were fully capable to understand its situation. I argue
that there are two different kinds of causes of evil: nature and free will. I show that there is
no problem of evil implied by the existence of evil as such. I distinguish between problems
of evil, solutions to problems of evil, and theories of evil. I argue that the existence of evil is
problematic only for those worldviews that cannot provide a theory of evil. I argue that in
contrast to naturalistic worldviews, Christian worldviews have the resources to successfully
establish a theory of evil.
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1. What is Evil?












ties	 like	having	a	certain	size	or	shape.	Despite	 this	 fact,	evil	 is	a	property	
related	to	the	obtaining	of	states	of	affairs:	if	there	are	two	possible	worlds,	
w	and	w*,	which,	at	a	particular	point	of	time,	have	the	same	history	and	the	

















































A	 sufficient	 condition	 for	 the	 state	of	 affairs	 to	be	evil	 is	 that	 a	 subject	of	
experience	suffers	mentally	or	physically,	although	 the	cause	of	 the	suffer-
ing	is	neither	morally	justifiable	nor	leading	to	a	greater	good	for	the	subject	





and	mental	suffering	 if	 it	 is	not	morally	excusable	nor	 leading	 to	a	greater	
good	one	wants	to	achieve.
Since,	however,	not	every	subject	of	experience	is	able	to	reflect	with	enough	


















2. What are the Causes of Evil?




for	 by	 Chalmers.	 Chalmers	 is	 right	 in	 stat-
ing	 that	 ‘experience’	 is	 a	 term	 in	 line	 with	
the	 notions	 of	 	 “‘qualia’,	 ‘phenomenology’,	
phenomenal’,	 ‘subjective	 experience’,	 and	
‘what	it	is	like’.	Apart	from	grammatical	dif-
ferences,	 the	 differences	 among	 these	 terms	
are	 mostly	 subtle	 matters	 of	 connotation.	
‘To	 be	 conscious’	 in	 this	 sense	 is	 roughly	
synonymous	with	 ‘to	 have	 qualia’,	 ‘to	 have	
subjective	experience’,	and	so	on.	Any	differ-
ences	 in	 the	 class	 of	 phenomena	picked	out	
are	 insignificant”	 (Chalmers	 1996:	 6).	 Pope	
and	Singer	(1978:	1)	provide	a	rough	circum-
scription	 of	what	 belongs	 to	 the	 instance	 of	
consciousness	 thus	understood:	 “The	 stream	
of	consciousness	–	 that	 flow	of	perceptions,	












complexions	 shift	 across	 time	 and	 space”	
(Juengst	 2013:	 50).	As	 Caplan	 (2013:	 202)	
says	in	respect	to	the	biological	nature	of	hu-
man	beings,	“is	 there	a	‘nature’	 that	 is	com-
mon	to	all	humans,	both	those	that	exist	now	
and	 that	 have	 existed	 in	 the	 past?	The	 fight	
over	whether	there	is	any	such	thing	as	a	hu-




as	 to	 whether	 these	 have	 produced	 a	 single	
‘nature’	 that	 all	 members	 of	 humanity	 pos-
sess.	 (…)	 If	 one	 surveys	 all	 humans,	 across	
cultures,	 those	 of	 all	 ages	 and	 varieties	 of	
congenital	 defects,	 and	 those	 from	 different	




calist	 ontology,	 then	mental	 suffering	 is	 on-
tologically	 reducible	 to	 physical	 suffering.	
In	what	follows,	I	suppose	that	at	least	prima 








cases,	 a	 subject	 of	 experience	 that	 suffers	
from	evil	does	not	have	the	power	to	change	
its	situation,	at	 least	not	easily.	 If	every	evil	






of	affairs	has	 to	be	such	 that	 it	 is	not	 in	 the	
control	of	the	subject	involved	to	change	it.
5
Rowe	 (1979:	 337)	 describes	 the	 fawn	 thus:	
“In	 some	 distant	 forest	 lightning	 strikes	 a	
dead	tree,	resulting	in	a	forest	fire.	In	the	fire	
a	fawn	is	trapped,	horribly	burned,	and	lies	in	














microscopic	causes	of	evil	only	cause	 suffering	 for	a	particular	 individual.	
Macroscopic	 causes	of	 evil	 entail	mesoscopic	 and	microscopic	 causes,	but	
not	the	other	way	around.
Concerning	free	will:	libertarian	free	will	is	a	cause	of	evil	in	the	sense	that	
a	 free	decision	of	a	 subject	of	experience	 leads	 to	 the	obtaining	of	an	evil	
state	of	affairs	in	which	a	subject	of	experience	suffers	in	the	sense	explained	
above.	 Because,	 however,	 from	 an	 epistemological	 point	 of	 view,	 we	 can	
























it	 is	 subjects	of	experiences	 freely	deciding	 to	kill	or	 injure	or	 torture	other	
individuals,	whether	 it	 is	 their	betraying	other	 individuals	and	 their	 lying	 to	
them,	the	possibilities	to	freely	cause	evil	are	numerous	and	effect	subjects	of	
experience,	so	far,	both	on	a	mesoscopic	and	microscopic	level.


















To	understand	what	 is	 problematic	about	 the	existence	of	 evil,	we	have	 to	
reflect	briefly	on	the	concept	of	worldviews.	A	worldview	is	a	set	of	assump-
tions	that	shapes	the	way	in	which	each	one	of	us	understands	what	is	going	
in	 their	 life	 and	 in	 the	world	 as	 a	whole.	 It	 is	 in	 and	 through	worldviews	
that	we	understand	the	phenomena	that	are	present	 to	us,	both	individually	











nature	 in	 terms	 of	 physical	 particulars	 and	
their	dispositions.
7
There	 is,	 of	 course,	 an	element	of	 fuzziness	
involved	here.	However,	for	our	present	pur-
pose	the	definition	of	relevant	states	of	affairs	
is	 enough	 to	 come	 to	 conclusions	 about	 the	
problem	of	evil.
8
Statements	 like	 this	 are	 often	 understood	 as	






thing	 like	 this:	 if,	under	a	veil	of	 ignorance,	
one	could	choose	having	a	 life	with	 the	dis-
ability	or	a	 life	without	 it,	 then	it	seems	ob-
jectively	 reasonable	 preferring	 not	 to	 have	
the	disability,	even	if	factually,	if	one	has	it,	
one’s	 life	 is	 not	 to	 the	 slightest	 degree	 less	
valuable.
9









“transhumanism	 is	 a	 set	of	dynamic	and	di-
verse	approaches	to	the	relationship	between	
technology,	 self,	 and	 society.	 Since	 transhu-





that	 hold	 an	 optimistic	 view	 of	 technology	
as	 having	 the	 potential	 to	 assist	 humans	 in	






For	 instance,	 catholic	 and	 protestant	 world-

















































































4. The Problem of Evil in 






























Cf.	 Sire	 1997,	 Walsh	 and	 Middleton	 1984.	
Apostel	 and	 Van	 der	 Veken	 (1991:	 29–30)	
specify	 the	 following	essential	 questions	 re-
lated	to	the	analysis	of	worldviews:	“(a)	What	
is?	 Ontology	 (model	 of	 being),	 (b)	 Where	
does	it	all	come	from?	Explanation	(model	of	
the	past);	(c)	Where	are	we	going?	Prediction	
(model	of	 the	 future);	 (d)	What	 is	good	and	
evil?	Axiology	 (theory	 of	 values),	 (e)	 How	




This	 assumes	 that	 a	 meta-criterion	 for	 the	
plausibility	of	a	particular	worldview	consists	
in	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 are	 shared	 and	univer-
sal	 standards	 of	 rationality.	 Although	 this	
assumption	is	highly	controversial,	I	will	as-
sume	it	in	what	follows.	As	Vidal	(2012:	318)	
says,	 “from	 a	 dialectical	 and	 second-order	
perspective,	 a	 philosopher	 can	 explore	 and	
understand	a	plurality	of	worldviews.	But	as	




















































eternal,	omniscient,	omnivolent,	 and	omnipotent	creator	of	 the	universe	ex 
nihilo,	who	can	interfere	in	the	history	of	the	actual	world,	in	principle,	at	any	
time.	This	God	of	Christianity,	it	is	argued,	by	his	omnipotence	could	prevent	



















is	hardly	 any	unanimity	 amongst	Christians	how	 to	 spell	 out	 the	Christian	





tian	God	 is	 the	concept	of	God	as	 specified	 in	 the	premises	of	 the	various	























work,	 and	how	drastic	 the	 judgement	might	
be,	 the	 assumptions	 that	 there	 is	 a	 life	 after	
death	 and	 that	 something	 will	 happen	 that	















chological	problem	of	evil	 follows	 from	 the	




individual	 level,	at	 least	 if	 the	sufferer	 is	an	
adherent	of	the	worldview	in	question.
19
Cf.	 Mackie	 (1955:	 200)	 for	 a	 clear	 formu-
lation	of	 the	 logical	problem	of	 evil:	 “In	 its	
simplest	 form	 the	 problem	 is	 this:	 God	 is	
omnipotent;	God	is	wholly	good;	and	yet	evil	
exists.	There	seems	to	be	some	contradiction	
between	 these	 three	 propositions,	 so	 that	 if	
any	two	of	them	were	true	the	third	would	be	





In	 theological	 contexts,	 solutions	 and	 theo-







which	 God	 and	 evil	 both	 exist.	 Sometimes	




have	 good	 scientific	 or	 historical	 reasons	 to	
regard	false.	A	theodicy	is	a	story	that	has	the	
same	internal	features	as	a	defense,	but	which	









some	 evil,	 but	 vast	 amounts	 of	 horrendous	
evil,	and	it	will,	finally,	ascribe	to	God	anoth-






























nature,	 free	will	 is	 impossible:	We	can	only	act	 freely	 in	a	world	which	 is	
regulated	by	laws	of	nature,	but	not	determined	by	laws	of	nature.	Only	this	





















































Cf.	Wildman	 (2009:	 616):	 “The	 varieties	 of	
[theism]	 run	 from	 process	 theism	 to	 deism,	
and	form	the	philosophical	subtleties	of	Bos-
ton	Personalism	to	 the	dualistic	hypostatiza-
tion	 of	 human	 experiences	 of	 pleasure	 and	
pain	 in	 Zoroastrianism	 and	 Manichaeism.”	
Bishop	(1998:	174)	is	right	when	he	suggests	






omnibenevolent,	 supernatural	 person	who	 is	
creator	 and	 sustainer	 of	 all	 else	 that	 exists?	















mans	 have	 a	 certain	 sort	 of	 free	will	which	
I	 shall	 call	 free	 and	 responsible	 choice,	 but	






kind	 of	 choice	 which	 the	 free-will	 defence	
extols.	There	are	 two	ways	 in	which	natural	
































































































































assume	 that	although	 there	 is	objective	morality	 suffering	 from	evil	 is	bad	
luck,	in	vain,	and	never	atoned	for.
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Postojanje zla u kršćanskim 
i naturalističkim svjetonazorima
Sažetak
Razjašnjavam da se za zlo stanje stvari može reći da je zlo stanje stvari kada zadovoljava 
sljedeće uvjete: (a) uključuje tjelesnu ili mentalnu patnju subjekta iskustva, (b) moralno je ne­
opravdivo, (c) ne vodi do većeg dobra upletenog subjekta i (d) kada bi subjekt imao potpuno 
razumijevanje situacije, onda bi preferirao da se u takvomu stanju ne nalazi. Argumentiram da 
postoje dvije vrste uzroka zla: priroda i slobodna volja. Pokazujem da problem zla ne postoji 
strogo na temelju postojanja zla. Postavljam razliku između problema zla, rješenja problema 
zla i teorije zla. Argumentiram da je postojanje zla problematično samo za onakve svjetonazore 
kakvi ne mogu osigurati teoriju zla. Suprotno naturalističkim svjetonazorima, kršćanski svjeto­








Existenz des Bösen in christlichen 
und naturalistischen Weltanschauungen
Zusammenfassung
Ich stelle klar, dass man einen Zustand der Beziehungen, der böse ist, als einen bösen Zustand 
der Beziehungen charakterisieren kann, falls folgende Bedingungen erfüllt werden: (a) Der 
betreffende Zustand bezieht das körperliche oder mentale Leiden des Subjekts der Erfahrung 
ein, (b) Er ist moralisch nicht zu rechtfertigen, (c) Er führt nicht zum größeren Wohl des invol­
vierten Subjekts und (d) Hätte das Subjekt das vollkommene Verständnis der Situation, würde 
es dann bevorzugen, sich nicht in einem solchen Zustand zu befinden. Ich argumentiere, dass 
es zwei Arten von Ursachen des Bösen gibt: die Natur und der freie Wille. Ich zeige, dass das 
Problem des Bösen nicht strikt auf der Grundlage der Existenz des Bösen besteht. Ich setze 
den Unterschied zwischen dem Problem des Bösen, der Lösung des Problems des Bösen und 
der Theorie des Bösen. Ich argumentiere, die Existenz des Bösen sei lediglich für solcherart 
Weltanschauungen problematisch, die keine Theorie des Bösen liefern können. Entgegen den 
naturalistischen Weltanschauungen verfügt die christliche Weltanschauung über die Vorausset­





L’existence du mal dans les visions 
du monde chrétienne et naturaliste
Résumé
Je clarifie le fait que pour la situation qu’est le mal, il est possible de dire que le mal est un 
état des choses lorsqu’il répond aux conditions suivantes : (a) il inclut une douleur physique 
et mentale pour le sujet de l’expérience, (b) il est injustifiable d’un point de vue morale, (c) 
il ne mène pas à un plus grand bien pour le sujet en question, (d) si le sujet avait une pleine 
compréhension de la situation, il préférerait alors ne pas se trouver dans une telle situation. 
J’argumente en faveur de l’existence de deux causes du mal : la nature et le libre­arbitre. Je 
montre que le problème du mal n’existe pas de manière absolue sur la base de l’existence du 
mal. Je pose une différence entre le problème du mal, la résolution du problème du mal et la 
théorie sur le mal. J’argumente que l’existence du mal est problématique uniquement pour les 
visions du monde qui ne peuvent assurer une théorie du mal. Contrairement aux visions du 
monde naturaliste, la vision du monde chrétienne comporte les conditions pour l’établissement 
d’une théorie du mal efficace.
Mots-clés
mal,	théorie	du	mal,	nature,	libre-arbitre,	vision	du	monde	chrétienne,	vision	du	monde	naturaliste
